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Articles
Virtual Territoriality
EDWARD J. JANGER*
Current efforts to harmonize the laws of secured cred-
it and bankruptcy, and to centralize bankruptcy case
administration are predicated on the belief that regu-
larizing debtor's rights and creditor's remedies will
cause global business to flourish and will benefit both
developed and less-developed countries. Certain and
predictable remedies for creditors will facilitate lend-
ing and development. Coordination among courts will
create opportunities to protect the going concern val-
ue of troubled businesses. The benefits that accompa-
ny such legal harmonization may, however, come at a
price. Centralizing control of a bankruptcy case may
create opportunities for forum shopping, and local le-
gal variation can be a product of local culture, con-
sidered policy choices or innovation. As a result, ex-
cessive harmonization can sweep away cultural
differences, produce political resistance and stifle ef-
ficient experimentation and evolution of the law.
In this article Professor Janger explores whether
choice-of-law rules might be used to address these
concerns about harmonization and centralization of
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bankruptcy law. He advocates a choice-of-law prin-
ciple that he calls "virtual territoriality. " Virtual ter-
ritoriality envisions a global, procedurally centralized
bankruptcy case that, to the extent possible, respects
the entitlements created by the various jurisdictions
where the debtor does business. Under this view, the
procedural bankruptcy laws of the "home" country
should govern the case, while the choice of substan-
tive law should be determined by ordinary (non-
bankruptcy) choice-of-law principles. This approach,
he argues, can form the basis for a cross-border bank-
ruptcy architecture that simultaneously (1) facilitates
the administration of a global bankruptcy, and (2) fa-
cilitates the international acceptance of rescue based
domestic insolvency regimes.
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INTRODUCTION
Current efforts to harmonize the laws of secured credit and
bankruptcy are predicated on the belief that regularizing the law of
debtor's rights and creditor's remedies will cause global business to
flourish, and benefit both developed and less-developed countries.
Certain and predictable remedies for creditors will facilitate lending
and development,1 and coordination among courts will create oppor-
tunities to protect the going concern value of troubled businesses. 2
These benefits that accompany legal harmonization efforts may,
however, come at a price. Local legal variation can be a product of
considered policy choices, culture or innovation.3 As a result, exces-
sive legal harmonization can sweep away cultural identity, produce
political resistance and stifle efficient experimentation and evolution
of the law.4
1. PHILIP R. WOOD, MAPS OF WORLD FINANCIAL LAW (Sweet & Maxwell 2008);
PHILIP R. WOOD, COMPARATIVE LAW OF SECURITY INTERESTS AND TITLE FINANCE (Sweet &
Maxwell 2007).
2. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Delult, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 2276, 2277 (2000) [hereinafter Westbrook, Global Solution].
3. The interaction between formal legal systems and legal and non-legal culture can
be quite complex in bankruptcy. Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, The Persistence qf Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence .rom the
Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 801, 804 (1994). Different nations
take different views of the purposes of the bankruptcy system. Some focus on liquidation,
while others focus on rescue. Rizwaan Jameel Mokal & John Armour, The New UK
Corporate Rescue Procedure-The Administrator's Duty to Act Rationally, 1 INT'L CORP.
RESCUE 136 (2004) (describing the development of "rescue" culture in the United
Kingdom); see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Eric A. Feldman, The
Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World's Premier Fish Market, 94 CAL. L. REV. 313
(2006).
4. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932).
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Over the last two decades, multilateral organizations such as
the World Bank, the UN, the EU and the IMF have initiated projects
that seek to harmonize procedures for cross-border bankruptcies and
standardize the national laws that govern bankruptcy and secured
credit. These related initiatives have produced a number of success-
ful products in the last decade: The UNCITRAL Model Law on
Cross Border Insolvencies (Model Law)5 has now been enacted in the
United States, as Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Chapter
15),6 as well as in fourteen other countries; 7 the EC Regulation on In-
solvency (EC Regulation) has been in force for several years; 8 the
American Law Institute's Principles of Cooperation Among the
NAFTA Countries (NAFTA Principles) articulates guidelines that
have helped regularize cross-border practice among Canada, Mexico
and the U.S.9, and, most recently, UNCITRAL has promulgated its
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (Legislative Guide),10 and is in
the final stages of promulgating a similar legislative guide for the law
of secured credit. 1
The nature of harmonization efforts, however, raises the con-
cern that the proposed uniform rules may not be optimal, or even an
improvement over the existing non-uniformity. Harmonization ef-
5. U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL], MODEL LAW ON CROSS-
BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3 (1997),
available at http:/ www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf [hereinafter
UNCITRAL Model Law]; see also G.A. Res. 52/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/158 (Jan. 30,
1998).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 1501 (2000).
7. The countries other than the United States which have adopted the Model Law are:
Australia (2008), British Virgin Islands, overseas territory of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland (2005), Colombia (2006), Eritrea (1998), Great Britain (2006),
Japan (2000), Mexico (2000), Montenegro (2002), New Zealand (2006), Poland (2003),
Republic of Korea (2006), Romania (2003), Serbia (2004) and South Africa (2000).
UNCITRAL, Status of the 1997 Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/insolvency/1997Model-status.html (last
visited May 5, 2010).
8. Council Regulation 1346/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC), available at http:/eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do'?uri OJ:L:2000:160:0001:0018:en:PDF)
[hereinafter EC Regulation].
9. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION AMONG THE NAFTA
COUNTRIES (Juris Publishing 2003).
10. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2004), available at http:/
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/insolvency/2004Guide.html.
11. See UNCITRAL (Draft) Legislative Guide on Secured Credit, available at: http://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-Ig/e/final-final.clean.0 1 -07-09.pdf.
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forts are prone to certain predictable types of political process failure,
including capture and jurisdictional competition. 12 As such, the de-
sirability and appropriate scope of such efforts turns on the nature of
the interests seeking harmonization, the robustness of the institution
coordinating the harmonization effort, and whether the rule subject to
harmonization is of the sort likely to generate beneficial or pernicious
jurisdictional competition. 13
In a recent article, I made a normative argument for limiting
the harmonization of bankruptcy law to matters of procedure and, to
a limited extent, choice-of-law.14 I call this vision of limited harmo-
nization "universal proceduralism." Under universal proceduralism,
the limited goal of harmonization would be to facilitate a single, co-
ordinated, cross-border case while minimizing both the pressure to
harmonize the substantive aspects of bankruptcy law and the stakes
associated with forum choice. 15 I will rehearse those arguments here
in somewhat abbreviated form. The focus of this article, however, is
on fleshing out (though still in broad strokes) the choice-of-law prin-
ciples that should govern such a regime. In this article I seek to de-
velop a set of choice-of-law principles that would simultaneously (1)
facilitate the administration of a global bankruptcy case as envisioned
by the UNCITRAL Model Law, and (2) facilitate the acceptance of
rescue-based, "modem," insolvency regimes, along lines envisioned
by the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide. 16
12. Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Unifrrm Law Process Will Fail: Article 9,
Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569 (1998) [hereinafter Janger,
Predicting]; Alan Schwartz & Robert Scott, The Political Economy (?'Private Legislatures,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995); Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and
Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743 (1999).
13. 1 explore the dynamics of legislative capture and jurisdictional competition in
greater detail in a recent article, Edward J. Janger, Universal Proceduralism, 32 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 819, 830 (2007) [hereinafter Janger, Proceduralism]. In particular, I distinguish
beneficial jurisdictional competition, otherwise known as a "race to the top," from
pernicious jurisdictional competition, otherwise known as "race to the bottom." See also
Janger, Predicting, supra note 12, at 579.
14. Janger, Proceduralism, supra note 13, at 831.
15. Id. at 834.
16. Later in this essay I will be quite critical of the choice-of-law provisions contained
in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide. See in/ra notes 25-72 and accompanying text. This
should not be construed to reflect disagreement with other portions of the Legislative Guide.
Indeed, the Legislative Guide showed remarkable sensitivity to the need for individual
nations to adopt insolvency laws that are consistent with local legal systems and that reflect
local policy preferences. Indeed, it is my hope that the choice-of-law framework articulated
20101
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Universal proceduralism is situated between the two main
competing approaches to administering cross-border insolvency cas-
es-modified universalism and cooperative territoriality. Modified
universalism, advocated by Jay Westbrook among others, seeks, to
the extent possible, to create one universal bankruptcy case, adminis-
tered under the bankruptcy law of the jurisdiction where the debtor
has its center of main interests (COMI). Courts of other "ancillary"
jurisdictions participate to the limited extent of helping to gather as-
sets and to implement the decisions of the "main" forum. 17
Cooperative territorialism, advocated principally by Lynn
LoPucki, envisions multiple full scale bankruptcies administering lo-
cal assets and local claims according to local law, but with the multi-
here will facilitate the modernization of insolvency laws along the lines envisioned in the
Legislative Guide.
17. Jay Westbrook has written extensively on modified universalism. See Harold
Burman & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Introductory Note: United Nations Commission on
International Trade Lawt: Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 36 I.L.M. 1386 (1997);
Donald T. Trautman, Emmanuel Gaillard & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Four Models br
International Bankruptcy, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 573 (1993); Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Avoidance of Pre-Bankruptcy Transactions in Multinational Bankruptcy Cases, 42 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 899, 901 (2007); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Chapter 15 and Discharge, 13 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 503 (2005); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, 79 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 713 (2005); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universalism and Choice of Lalv, 23
PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 625 (2005); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, International Judicial
Negotiation, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 567 (2003); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational
Enterprises in General Deliult: Chapter 15, the ALl Principles, and the EU Insolvency
Regulation, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2002); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Setting Global
Standards Ibr Cross-Border Insolvency, 21 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 9 (2002); Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, The Transnational Insolvency Project of the American Law Institute, 17 CONN.
J. INT'L L. 99 (2001); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Deflault,
98 MICH. L. REV. 2276 (2000); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Globalization qfInsolvency
Reform, 1999 N.Z. L. REV. 401 (1999); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Modeling International
Bankruptcy, 1998-1999 ANN, SuRv. BANKR. L. 465; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universal
Priorities, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 27 (1998); Jay Lawrence Westbrook & Jacob S. Ziegel, The
American Lav Institute NAFTA Insolvency Project, 23 Brook. J. INT'L L. 7 (1997); Jay
Lawrence Westbrook, The Commission's Recommendations Concerning the Treatment of
Bankruptcy Contracts, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463 (1997); Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563 (1996); Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, The Lessons ofMaxwell Communication, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2531 (1996); Jay
Lawrence Westbrook, Developments in Transnational Bankruptcy, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 745
(1995); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Comparative Insolvency Law, 28 TEx. INT'L L.J. 675
(1993) (reviewing HARRY RAJAK, A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE To EUROPEAN CORPORATE
INSOLVENCY LAW (1992)).
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pie cases coordinated through communication among administra-
tors. 18
The modified universalist vision animates the various multi-
lateral initiatives, including the Model Law and the EC Regulation.
Key to that vision is the idea of one "main" case that coordinates the
global efforts of the debtor to reorganize. 19 For this regime to work,
courts in multiple jurisdictions must recognize and extend comity (or
defer) to orders issued by the court in the main jurisdiction. Courts
should recognize the representatives of foreign bankruptcy cases, and
respect the orders of the case pending at the debtor's COMI. The
idea is to create a "universal" or "global" case that will allow for the
orderly treatment of the debtor's assets and operations in all of the
relevant jurisdictions. 20 The signature theme of modified universal-
ism is centralizing control of the bankruptcy in the "main" case.21
This centralization carries with it two consequences. First,
changing the location of a debtor's main case may change the recov-
eries obtained by creditors, even those that never dealt with the debt-
or in its "home" country. Second, these outcome differences create
incentives for parties, and indeed nations, to act opportunistically, re-
spectively, by forum shopping and competing for debtors. This op-
portunity for gamesmanship created by centralization is the Catch-22
that leads LoPucki to reject modified universalism. 22 The modified
universalists offer a number of responses: COMI choice is not entire-
18. LYNN M. LoPucKi, COURTING FAILURE (2005) [hereinafter LOPUCKI, COURTING
FAILURE]; Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist
Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696 (1999); Lynn M. LoPucki, Global and Out of Control?,
79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 79 (2005) [hereinafter LoPucki, Global]; Lynn M. LoPucki,
Universalism Unravels, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143 (2005); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case Ibr
Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REv. 2216 (2000).
19. Samuel L. Bufford, Global Venue Controls Are Coming: A Reply to Professor
LoPucki, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 105, 109 (2005) ("Universalism has developed a specialized
terminology. The dominant case in the 'home country' is called the 'main' case or
proceeding. A case in any other country is called a 'secondary' or 'non-main' case or
proceeding." (citations omitted)).
20. The emphasis is, however, an orderly treatment. The UNCITRAL Model Law and
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code recognize that some cases may best be
administered as dual (or multiple) plenary cases. Sections 1525 28 of the Bankruptcy Code
specifically contemplate such cases and seek to facilitate coordination among courts. 11
U.S.C. §§ 1525-28.
21. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Locating the Eye of the Financial Storm, 32 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 1019, 1022 (2007) [hereinafter Westbrook, Financial Storm].
22. LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 18, at 143.
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ly manipulable; 23 courts can refuse to cooperate if fundamental local
policies are implicated 24 and, most importantly, harmonization of na-
tional insolvency laws may ultimately eliminate these outcome dif-
ferences.25 In my view, these responses are each insufficient. While
the concept of COMI constrains a debtor's forum choice, this has not
prevented COMI from becoming a hotly contested issue in many
cross-border cases. 26 The ability of courts to push back or refuse co-
operation is not a solution, but simply a restatement of the problem.
And, finally, for reasons I will discuss below, harmonization solves
the forum shopping problem, but deprives nations of the power to
implement their own policies about how various creditor constituen-
cies should be treated when a business fails.27
Instead of siding with LoPucki, and throwing in the towel on
universalism, however, I seek to articulate a set of choice-of-law
principles to help neutralize these linked concerns about jurisdiction-
al competition and forum shopping. The principles articulated here
suggest that there is a pragmatic and perhaps normative quid pro quo
for realizing the modified universalist aspiration: In return for recog-
nition and cooperation, the court handling the case pending at the
debtor's COMI should treat assets and claims in a manner that, as
closely as possible, matches the treatment that would have been ac-
corded had the case been handled territorially (at least as a distribu-
tional floor). Instead of one case under one law or many cases under
many laws, this essay advocates one case under many laws-
governed under a principle of "best interests," or Pareto optimality.
The choice-of-law principle that accompanies universal pro-
ceduralism can be described as "virtual territoriality." Virtual territo-
riality, like universalism and territoriality, is a metaphor rather than a
legal rule, but it suggests a design principle for administering cross-
border cases. Under virtual territoriality, in a cross-border case, a ju-
risdiction's bankruptcy procedure should, insofar as possible, be dis-
tinguished from that jurisdiction's law of substantive legal entitle-
ments. The procedural bankruptcy laws of the "home" country
should govern the case, but even in a case where all assets are admin-
23. Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 2, at 2317; see also Westbrook, Financial
Storm, supra note 21, at 1039.
24. Westbrook, Financial Storm, supra note 21, at 1032.
25. Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 2, at 2318.
26. See infi-a notes 33 35 and accompanying text.
27. See infi-a notes 67 70 and accompanying text.
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istered centrally, the choice of substantive law should be determined
by ordinary (non-bankruptcy) choice-of-law principles.
This distinction between bankruptcy substance and bankrupt-
cy procedure is not, of course, tidy, either as a practical or a concep-
tual matter. Bankruptcy law, by its very nature, affects (and usually
limits) the remedies available to creditors. 28 It therefore alters the
practical value of substantive entitlements. Particularly in jurisdic-
tions that seek to facilitate rescue (reorganization), the ability of a se-
cured creditor to foreclose may be limited, and shareholders and
creditors may be forced to share in the decision of how to dispose of
a debtor's assets. 29 This does not mean, however, that one cannot, or
should not, seek to distinguish substance from procedure. The essen-
tial question is functional rather than abstract: Whether (1) bankrupt-
cy policy, or the exigencies of a bankruptcy case, demand that the
law of the debtor's center of main interest should govern; or (2) reor-
ganization efforts can accommodate a regime under which non-
uniform choice-of-law principles may govern.
The first section of this article will describe the choice-of-law
regimes articulated in the EC Regulation and the UNCITRAL Legis-
lative Guide, and show how both (with some important variations)
are motivated by the modified universalist vision. It will then show
how this has caused COMI choice to become a major fighting issue
in cross-border cases. Second, the article will explain the reasons
why a universal proceduralist approach to cross-border insolvency is
preferable to either a universal or a territorial regime. Third, it will
explore which bankruptcy rules must be governed by the law at the
debtor's COMI for such a case to function, and which rules can be
allowed to vary depending on national choices and private interna-
tional law. Fourth, and finally, it will give two examples of how
principles of virtual territoriality have already influenced the cross-
border cases of Collins and Aikman 30 and Federal Mogul.3 1 These
cases offer excellent examples of how virtual territoriality might
function in practice, and also illustrate a number of its positive attrib-
utes.
28. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 524, 1141.
29. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 1129; see also Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 1, §§ 1 3
(U.K.), available at http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/
legislation/uklinsolvencyact.pdf
30. Re Collins & Aikman Europe, [2006] EWHC (Ch) 1343.
31. In re Federal-Mogul Global, 330 B.R. 133 (2005).
20101
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I. CHOICE-OF-LAW UNDER THE EC REGULATION AND IN THE
UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE
At the moment, determining a debtor's COMI is the most hot-
ly litigated issue in international insolvency. In the European Union,
no issue under the EC Regulation has been litigated as vehemently.
In Daisytek,32 England and France wrestled for control of the debt-
or's case largely because a nervous director could not figure out with
certainty whether a filing was necessary in France, and the French
court misunderstood the British methods for publishing judicial opin-
ions. In the Eurofoods33 case, an Irish registered financial subsidiary
of Parmalat, an Italian food producer, in a case being administered
out of Italy, was held to have its COMI in Ireland.34 Similarly, under
newly enacted Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, there are al-
ready three significant decisions on how to determine a debtor's
COMI, including two conflicting cases in the Southern District of
New York.35 This should not be a surprise. While the Model Law
does not address choice-of-law issues per se, and under Chapter 15,
the consequences of COMI choice are as of yet untested, under the
EC Regulation, U.S. law, and the regime envisioned by the Legisla-
tive Guide, the consequences are significant, and apparently worth
fighting over. COMI choice matters.
In this section, I will describe the choice-of-law rules articu-
lated in the EC Regulation and the Legislative Guide. I will argue
that both the EC Regulation and the Legislative Guide share the aspi-
rations and language of modified universalism, and as a result, place
much power in the hands of the forum court. This centralization in-
creases the importance of COMI choice. In the rest of this essay, I
32. Re Daisytek-ISA Ltd., [2003] B.C.C. 562 (Ch); Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court
of appeal] Versailles, Sept. 4, 2003, [2003] B.C.C. 984 (Fr.) (Klempka v. ISA Daisytek SA);
see also Gabriel Moss, Group Insolvency Choice of Forum and Lawt: The European
Experience Under the Influence of English Pragmatism, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1005, 1010-
11 (2007).
33. Re Eurofood IFSC, Ltd., [2005] B.C.C. 999, 1003 (S.C.) (Jr.).
34. Id.; see also Samuel L. Bufford, Center olMain Interests, International Insolvency
Case Venue, and Equality of Arms: The Eurolbod Decision of the European Court of
Justice, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 351, 374-75 (2007).
35. In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., 374
B.R. 122, 129-30 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re SPhinX, 351 B.R. 103, 119-20 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2006), aqf'd, 2007 WL 1965597 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2007); In re Tri-Continental
Exchange Ltd., 349 B.R. 627, 639 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006).
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will question the wisdom of this approach, and suggest that a more
modest, and preferable, approach is emerging on the ground.
A. Choice-of-Law and Choice-of-Forum
In a cross-border insolvency case, choice-of-law consists of
two nested inquiries: First, "which jurisdiction will host the 'main
proceeding?"' and second, "which questions of law will be deter-
mined conclusively by the law of the forum where the main case is
pending, and which will be determined by ordinary choice-of-law
principles?" 36
Most controversy has focused on the first of these inquiries-
how to identify the "main proceeding." Under both the Model Law
and the EC Regulation, the "main" proceeding is the case opened at a
debtor's center of main interest or "COMI.''37 Both statutes also
agree that the center of main interest is presumed to be the jurisdic-
tion where the debtor is incorporated. 38 Here, however, is where the
agreement ends. There are a number of pressure points. First, how
strong is the presumption in favor of jurisdiction of incorporation? 39
While it is agreed that the presumption can be rebutted by showing
that the main executive functions, assets and/or operations are located
elsewhere, how much proof is enough is unclear.40 Second, concep-
tually, does a debtor only have one COMI or might a debtor have
36. Under Chapter 15, the first inquiry is mandated by 11 U.S.C. § 1517(b). The
second is not discussed at all, and is presumably left to the choice-of-law rules of the forum
court. By contrast, Article 4 of the EC Regulation spells out in detail when forum law
should govern, and when private international law will determine the governing law. See
notes 59-60 in/ra.
37. EC Regulation, art. 3; 11 U.S.C. § 1517(b).
38. EC Regulation, art. 3; 11 U.S.C. § 1516(c).
39. Compare Re Eurofood IFSC, Ltd., [2005] B.C.C. 999, 1003 (S.C.) (Ir.) (applying a
strong presumption in favor of jurisdiction of incorporation), with In re Bear Stearns High-
Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., 374 B.R. 122 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(refusing to recognize Cayman Island case as the "main" case for a Cayman Island registered
corporation), and SPhinX, 351 B.R. at 117 (bankruptcy court has discretion in determining
COMI).
40. Moss, supra note 33, at 1006; Council Regulation 1346/2000, Recital (13), 2000
O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/952/01/insolvency-report-schmidt_
1988.pdf.
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multiple COMIs? 41 Third, might a court have discretion in determin-
ing a debtor's COMI, as the Southern District of New York deter-
mined in the SPhinX case,42 or is COMI choice non-discretionary, as
another court in the Southern District decided in the Bear Stearns
case? 43
This article focuses instead on which choice-of-law questions
should be determined by forum choice, and which should be deter-
mined by ordinary choice-of-law principles. It seeks to delink
choice-of-law from forum choice, and in so doing to reduce the
stakes associated with determining the debtor's COMI. This, in turn,
will reduce the incentives for parties to forum shop or to litigate fo-
rum choice.
Choice-of-law is often conflated with choice-of-forum. This
conflation is compounded by the fact that bankruptcy law is generally
thought to be procedural rather than substantive. A forum is general-
ly entitled to apply its own procedural rules, but will generally use
choice-of-law principles (sometimes called "private international
law") to determine the governing substantive rule of law. In the Unit-
ed States this is a rhetorical point and a normative bone of conten-
tion. Law and economics scholars such as Thomas Jackson, Douglas
Baird and, more recently, Chuck Mooney argue that bankruptcy law
is, and should be, merely a procedure for giving effect to non-
bankruptcy entitlements in cases where a business is unable to pay all
of its creditors. 44 Outside the U.S., this may be more accurately
characterized as a descriptive point; in the absence of procedures for
business rescue, insolvency law is little more than a procedure for
winding up a failed business. To the extent that bankruptcy is merely
procedure, choice-of-forum determines choice of procedure, and the
inquiry is at an end.
However, modem bankruptcy laws-in the United States and
elsewhere-are not purely procedural. Many provisions of national
41. In a world of multiple COMIs, a debtor may open its insolvency proceeding in any
one of a number ofjurisdictions; courts of other jurisdictions will be required to cooperate.
See Westbrook, Financial Storm, supra note 23.
42. SPhinX, 351 B.R. 103; In re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd., 349 B.R. 627 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. 2006).
43. In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., 374
B.R. 122 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
44. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (2001); James
Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (Spring 1987);
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory (#'Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy As (1s) Civil
Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931 (2004).
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insolvency laws are quite substantive. The rights of secured parties
are often subject to modification in bankruptcy. While the monetary
value of a secured creditor's claim is protected,45 foreclosure is often
delayed, 46 liens are frequently stripped down to the value of the col-
lateral, 47 and cash collateral is used by the debtor to fund opera-
tions, 48 much to the frustration of secured creditors. Similarly, spe-
cial governance rules are created by bankruptcy law, depriving
shareholders of control over incumbent management, and forcing
them to share control with a complex network of interested parties
under the supervision of a bankruptcy judge.49
Virtual territoriality seeks to take the substance/procedure dis-
tinction seriously, and, in so doing, to drain the heat from the debate
over COMI choice. If forum choice does not guarantee that all of the
provisions of the main jurisdiction's insolvency law will govern the
case, then the importance of COMI choice recedes. In short, bank-
ruptcy law might be disaggregated: While procedural rules should be
conclusively determined by the law of the forum, governing law for
substantive questions should, by contrast, be determined by reference
to principles of private international law.
This sets up a difficult task-determining the questions that
will be governed by the law of the forum, sometimes referred to as
lexforum concursus, and those that might potentially be governed by
the law of another jurisdiction under the forum's non-bankruptcy
choice-of-law rules, sometimes referred to as lex situs.50 To frame
the question more functionally, it is obviously easiest to administer a
cross-border bankruptcy case under one unified law. However, if
there are important reasons not to do this, then one must ask when
uniformity is essential to an orderly bankruptcy procedure, and when
non-uniformity can be tolerated. Which rules must be centralized
(through forum choice), and when can the process tolerate a decen-
tralized approach to governing law (through the use of private inter-
national law)? When should the forum state's interest in enforcing
its bankruptcy policies serve as a trump over ordinary (though per-
haps unpredictable) choice-of-law principles? Before offering my
45. 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 506.
46. Id. §§ 362, 363.
47. Id. §§ 506(d), 1125.
48. Id. § 363.
49. Id. §§ 363, 1107.
50. Legislative Guide, supra note 10, at 5.
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own suggestions, it seems worthwhile to survey the existing ap-
proaches.
B. Choice-of-Law for the Modified Universalist
For the modified universalist, centralization of the bankruptcy
case is the goal, and to the extent possible, forum choice should carry
with it the full panoply of the forum court's bankruptcy rules. In a
recent article, 51 Jay Westbrook articulates the view that modified
universalist choice-of-law rules should place significant power in the
hands of the forum court. As he puts it:
The close integration among bankruptcy rules and pol-
icies in each jurisdiction applies to the big four of
bankruptcy policy: control, priority, avoidance, and
reorganization policy. In a system of universalism
each of these four elements should be governed by the
law of the main proceeding. Under modified univer-
salism, such centralization should be the goal, alt-
hough not always the result.52
Under Westbrook's view, "centralization" is "the goal," and COMI
choice has significant consequences. It determines for whose benefit
the estate is administered, the effect of having a perfected security in-
terest 53 and the priority of claims and preference and fraudulent con-
veyance law.
These are among the most controversial elements of a bank-
ruptcy case, and national laws differ considerably. For example, in
England, a case was, historically, administered by an administrator
for the benefit of the secured creditors.54 By contrast, in the United
States, the estate is administered by a trustee or incumbent manage-
51. Westbrook, Financial Storm, supra note 23.
52. Id. at 1021-22 (emphasis added).
53. In using the word "priority" Westbrook could mean a number of different things.
He could be referring only to the ranking of various types of unsecured claims. He could
also be referring to the rights of the secured party against the bankruptcy estate, and finally
he could also include the mechanism for establishing priority among various secured parties.
Based on other writings, in particular his criticism of the decision in In re Treco, 240 F.3d
148 (2d Cir. 2001), 1 will infer that he includes the first two, but not the third. Westbrook,
Financial Storm, supra note 23, at 1024.
54. VANESSA FINCH, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW: PERSPECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES 21
(Cambridge 2002). The United Kingdom's Enterprise Act of 2002 has, more recently,
limited the power of secured creditors in bankruptcy.
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ment for the benefit of the creditors. 55 Similarly, among the most
common reasons that creditors will fight cooperation of a local pro-
ceeding with a main proceeding is the fear of different priority treat-
ment for secured claims. In one case, for example, a U.S. Court de-
clined to send assets to the Bahamas because a secured creditor's
claims were subordinate to the (in that case overwhelming) costs of
administration of the estate.56 Avoidance has been a common subject
of litigation as well. Indeed, it was the key issue in the Maxwell case,
where the U.S. and U.K. courts agreed to apply U.K. avoidance rules
rather than U.S. rules. 57
C. Modified Universalism in Practice-The EC Regulation
Only one multinational document currently in force addresses
choice-of-law in cross-border bankruptcies. The EC Regulation on
insolvency governs choice-of-law and choice-of-forum questions for
the bankruptcies of entities that cross borders within the EU. Under
the EC Regulation, choice-of-law is tightly linked to choice-of-
forum, and to the EC Regulation's rules on forum choice. Under Ar-
ticle 3(1), a company may only open a bankruptcy proceeding in the
country that is its COMI. 58 Once a proceeding has been opened at a
55. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1107.
56. Treco, 240 F.3d 148.
57. In re Maxwell Commc'n Corp., 170 B.R. 800, 818 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), q/"d,
186 B.R. 807, 822-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), qa/'d, 93 F.3d 1036, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996). As a
historical footnote here, the court appointed expert in Maxwell was Professor Westbrook.
Judge Brozman, the bankruptcy judge, agreed with Westbrook that U.K. law should govern
the preference claims at issue. However, Westbrook took the view that U.K. law should
apply because the United Kingdom was the COMI of the corporate debtors, while Judge
Brozman concluded that U.K. law should govern because the transactions themselves were
"located" in the United Kingdom. In this regard, the Brozman decision could be
characterized as an early example of virtual territoriality.
58. Article 3 of the EC Regulation states in pertinent part:
1. The courts of the Member State within the territory of which the centre of a
debtor's main interests is situated shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency
proceedings. In the case of a company or legal person, the place of the
registered office shall be presumed to be the centre of its main interests in the
absence of proof to the contrary.
2. Where the centre of a debtor's main interests is situated within the territory
of a Member State, the courts of another Member State shall have jurisdiction
to open insolvency proceedings against that debtor only if he possesses an
establishment within the territory of that other Member State. The effects of
those proceedings shall be restricted to the assets of the debtor situated in the
territory of the latter Member State.
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debtor's COMI, other "secondary" proceedings can be opened, but,
under Article 3(3), these secondary proceedings must be "winding
up" or liquidation proceedings.
On its face, this structure appears to create a strong bias in fa-
vor of centralizing the debtor's case around the case pending at the
debtor's COMI. The choice-of-law provisions gesture even further in
the direction of centralization. Article 4 of the EC Regulation states:
Save as otherwise provided in this Regulation, the law
applicable to insolvency proceedings and their effects
shall be that of the Member State within the territory
of which such proceedings are opened, hereafter re-
ferred to as the "State of the opening of proceed-
ings." 59
Article 4 of the EC Regulation then goes on to list the legal matters
that will be determined by the law of the forum court. The list is
long, and covers the full panoply of bankruptcy procedures, but also
includes a long list of rules that might more accurately be character-
ized as substantive:
(2) The law of the State of the opening of proceedings
shall determine the conditions for the opening of those
proceedings, their conduct and their closure. It shall
determine in particular:
(a) against which debtors insolvency proceedings
may be brought on account of their capacity;
(b) the assets which form part of the estate and the
treatment of assets acquired by or devolving on the
debtor after the opening of the insolvency pro-
ceedings;
(c) the respective powers of the debtor and the liq-
uidator;
(d) the conditions under which set-offs may be in-
voked;
(e) the effects of insolvency proceedings on cur-
rent contracts to which the debtor is party;
3. Where insolvency proceedings have been opened under paragraph 1, any
proceedings opened subsequently under paragraph 2 shall be secondary
proceedings. These latter proceedings must be winding-up proceedings.
59. EC Regulation, art. 4(1).
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(f) the effects of the insolvency proceedings on
proceedings brought by individual creditors, with
the exception of lawsuits pending;
(g) the claims which are to be lodged against the
debtor's estate and the treatment of claims arising
after the opening of insolvency proceedings;
(h) the rules governing the lodging, verification
and admission of claims;
(i) the rules governing the distribution of proceeds
from the realisation of assets, the ranking of
claims and the rights of creditors who have ob-
tained partial satisfaction after the opening of in-
solvency proceedings by virtue of a right in rem or
through a set-off;
() the conditions for and the effects of closure of
insolvency proceedings, in particular by composi-
tion;
(k) creditors' rights after the closure of insolvency
proceedings;
(1) who is to bear the costs and expenses incurred
in the insolvency proceedings;
(m) the rules relating to the voidness, voidability
or unenforceability of legal acts detrimental to all
the creditors. 60
If one were only to read Article 4, one might mistakenly think that
the "modified universalist" dream had been realized.
The reality is more ambiguous, and turns on the role of "sec-
ondaries" in the structure envisioned by the Regulation. First, Article
3 of the EC Regulation is silent about what law should apply in a
secondary proceeding. 61 Presumably, however, a court in a second-
ary would apply its own law to deal with claims of creditors that
could be asserted against assets of the debtor located in the secondary
jurisdiction. In other words, the case pending at the debtor's COMI
is "universal" but the EC Regulation appears to anticipate that the
secondaries will be "territorial." Second, the EC Regulation requires
that a secondary be a liquidation or "winding up" proceeding. It is
difficult to imagine a company engaging in a going concern reorgani-
zation based at the COMI, while simultaneously liquidating in the
60. Id. art. 4(2).
61. Id. art. 3.
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secondaries. In sum, the centralizing, reorganization-facilitating
"yin" of Article 4 runs headlong into the territorial, liquidation-
oriented "yang" of Article 3, and one is left asking whether the draft-
ers of the Regulation were schizophrenic, unable to agree, or con-
fused.
The EC Regulation appears to construct a game of choice-of-
law chicken. Universal principles apply in the main case to all assets
that can be administered without the benefit of secondaries, but terri-
torial principles control when a secondary must be opened. How
might this be operationalized? Where liquidations are involved, the
process should work smoothly, with the main case handling most of
the assets, but secondaries mopping up with territorial liquidations
where necessary. Rescue, however, is more problematic. Opening a
secondary would appear to cripple any firm's chance of reorganizing,
at least if key assets are located in the secondary jurisdiction. Fur-
thermore, Article 4 requires the main case to apply its own law to
questions of priority. 62 On the one hand, this centralizing principle
might make reorganization more straightforward. However, any time
a creditor thinks it might do better under the law of another jurisdic-
tion, it has the incentive to force the opening of a secondary.63
D. Modified Universalism in Practice-The UNCITRAL
Legislative Guide
The Legislative Guide is less schizophrenic about its univer-
salism, but this stems in part from the fact that it is merely a guide
and not intended to be enacted as a statute. The Legislative Guide, as
a tactical matter, generally takes a permissive rather than a prescrip-
tive approach. 64 Even its prescriptions are phrased as recommenda-
tions. The recommendations relating to choice-of-law are numbers
thirty through thirty-four.65 On its face, the Legislative Guide hews
62. Id. art. 4(2)(i).
63. As the discussion of Collins and Aikman, in/ha Part ILA, will show, Article 4 may
also limit the ability of the debtor to respond to these forum shopping threats by bargaining
with the uncooperative creditors.
64. Susan Block-Lieb & Terrence Halliday, Harmonization and Modernization in
UNCITRAL's Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, 42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 475, 507 (2007).
65. Recommendations 30-31 of the Legislative Guide draw the distinction between the
legal questions that are to be determined by forum choice and those that are to be determined
by private international law. They provide in pertinent part:
30. The law applicable to the validity and effectiveness of rights and claims
existing at the time of the commencement of insolvency proceedings should be
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to the procedure/substance distinction. The commentary to those
recommendations begins by drawing a distinction between the bank-
ruptcy law and non-bankruptcy law that will be applied in an interna-
tional case:
In the context of cross-border insolvency, it is essen-
tial to distinguish between the creation of rights and
claims under the law designated as applicable law
(whether domestic or foreign substantive law) in ac-
cordance with the conflict of laws rules of the forum
and the insolvency effects on those rights and
claims. 66
With regard to the status and validity of non-bankruptcy
claims, the Legislative Guide suggests that the forum state should
apply its own private international law (choice-of-law rules) to de-
termine which law applies. For example, for contract disputes the
law of the situs of the contract will determine the rights of the par-
ties.67 Similarly, the law of the jurisdiction where property is located
will generally determine the status of claims against the property. 68
The Legislative Guide draws a distinction, however, between
the validity of the claim and the treatment it receives in bankruptcy.
It is here that the Legislative Guide is at its most "universal," stating
that once the validity of the claim has been determined under the rel-
evant national law, the priority and treatment of the claim should be
dealt with under the bankruptcy law of the forum (lex fori concur-
sus):
determined by the private international law rules of the State in which
insolvency proceedings are commenced....
3 1. The insolvency law of the State in which insolvency proceedings are
commenced (lex f)ri concursus) should apply to all aspects of the
commencement, conduct, administration and conclusion of those insolvency
proceedings and their effects. These may include ....
(list set forth in text in/ha Part I.B) UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 10, at 72 73.
66. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 10, at 68, para. 82.
67. "It is typical under general conflict of laws rules, for example, that the law
governing the contract will determine if a contractual claim exists against the insolvent
debtor and the amount of that claim; that the lex rei sitae will determine if a security interest
in immovable assets has been created in favour of a specific creditor, and so on." Id.
68. One large exception is intangible property and mobile goods, which, at least under
U.S. law are deemed located where the debtor is located. Rules for perfection of security
interests in tangible property in the U.S. are also governed by the law of the jurisdiction
where the debtor is located. However, the effect of perfection is governed by the law of the
jurisdiction where the collateral is located. U.C.C. §§ 9-301 318.
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It is quite typical that the law of the State in which in-
solvency proceedings are commenced, the lex fori
concursus, will govern the commencement, conduct,
administration and conclusion of those proceedings.
This would generally include, for example, determin-
ing the debtors that may be subject to the insolvency
law; the parties that may apply for commencement of
insolvency proceedings and the eligibility tests to be
met; the effects of commencement, including the
scope of application of a stay; the organization of the
administration of the estate; the powers and functions
of the participants; rules on admissibility of claims;
priority and ranking of claims; and rules on distribu-
tion.69
Recommendation 31 contains an extensive list of matters that "may"
be determined by choice-of-forum:
The insolvency law of the State in which insolvency
proceedings are commenced (lex fori concursus)
should apply to all aspects of the commencement,
conduct, administration and conclusion of those insol-
vency proceedings and their effects. These may in-
clude, for example:
(a) Identification of the debtors that may be sub-
ject to insolvency proceedings;
(b) Determination of when insolvency proceedings
can be commenced and the type of proceeding that
can be commenced, the party that can apply for
commencement and whether the commencement
criteria should differ depending upon the party ap-
plying for commencement;
(c) Constitution and scope of the insolvency es-
tate;
(d) Protection and preservation of the insolvency
estate;
(e) Use or disposal of assets;
0 Proposal, approval, confirmation and imple-
mentation of a plan of reorganization;
69. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 10, at 68.
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(g) Avoidance of certain transactions that could be
prejudicial to certain parties;
(h) Treatment of contracts;
(i) Set-off;
() Treatment of secured creditors;
(k) Rights and obligations of the debtor;
() Duties and functions of the insolvency repre-
sentative;
(M) Functions of the creditors and creditor com-
mittee;
(n) Treatment of claims;
(o) Ranking of claims;
(p) Costs and expenses relating to the insolvency
proceedings;
(q) Distribution of proceeds;
(r) Conclusion of the proceedings; and
(s) Discharge. 70
This list of matters to be determined by choice-of-forum is most de-
cidedly not limited to the purely procedural elements of the home
court's bankruptcy law. While the list is permissive, rather than pre-
scriptive, it is quite long and, again, includes the full panoply of
bankruptcy issues from scope of the stay, nature of the estate, avoid-
ance powers, priority, treatment of secured claims, plan confirmation
to scope of the bankruptcy discharge. A jurisdiction whose bank-
ruptcy law sought to govern all of these matters would be making a
strong statement in favor of centralized control over bankruptcy cases
filed in that country. It would also be claiming for itself the power to
allocate and reallocate rights among creditor constituencies in ways
that differ from the allocations that would apply outside bankruptcy
or in a purely territorial bankruptcy case.
The universalism of the Legislative Guide is not unalloyed.
While envisioning a maximal universal case, the comments to Rec-
ommendation 31 acknowledge that many jurisdictions might choose
a narrower list, and might except: (1) settlement of payments and
regulation of financial markets; (2) labor law; (3) security interests
and (4) avoidance powers. 71 The first two exceptions are not particu-
70. Id. at 73.
71. Id. at 72.
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larly troubling, even for a committed universalist. It would be prob-
lematic for a foreign bankruptcy proceeding to interfere with the set-
tlement of payment transactions, and the law governing employees.
The second two would appear to be more radical departures from the
modified universalist vision. By excluding security interests (and by
implication property rights more generally), the Legislative Guide
makes a significant concession to political reality.72 Indeed, the in-
clusion of both security interests and avoidance powers on the sug-
gested list of topics that are appropriately governed by forum choice,
followed by a concession that they might be omitted, suggests that
the universalist aspiration of some of the Guide's drafters may have
been tempered by the territorial concerns of others. Nonetheless, the
list of exceptions in the legislative guide is far shorter than the list in
the EC Regulation.
In short, both the Model Law and the EC Regulation stop
short of full-scale realization of the modified universalist vision, but
choice-of-forum matters a great deal, especially under the EC Regu-
lation where the choice-of-law rules are mandatory. The Legislative
Guide is less prescriptive, but if a large number of jurisdictions were
to follow its recommendations there would be a significant substan-
tive component to forum choice under that regime as well. If the
goal of these provisions is to pave the way toward greater universal-
ism, then one can expect courts and legislatures to take an expansive
view of the effect of forum choice.
I believe, however, that this decision to take an expansive
view of lex forum concursus is both a tactical and a normative mis-
take. If this is the approach followed worldwide, one can expect to
continue to see extensive litigation over the location of a debtor's
COMI. Moreover, my concern is that outside the EU, the approach
may overstress the fragile cross-border architecture, and perhaps en-
danger the widespread harmonization even of procedural rules like
the Model Law.
II. UNIVERSAL PROCEDURALISM AND VIRTUAL TERRITORIALITY
While the benefits of uniformity and predictability extolled by
universalists and the proponents of the Legislative Guide are lauda-
ble, they may be overstated. The recent history of uniform lawmak-
72. In doing so, as I will discuss later, the Legislative Guide leaves open the possibility
for a universal proceduralist approach.
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ing in the U.S. 73 shows that harmonization efforts are prone to certain
predictable process failures that make them no more than second-best
lawmaking institutions. Uniform and model laws are not self execut-
ing. Therefore, harmonizers who hope for widespread adoption of
their product must anticipate the possibility of interest group activity
in adopting legislatures, and they must anticipate jurisdictional com-
petition. Accordingly, the scope of harmonization efforts should be
limited to the provisions where uniformity is most necessary. 74 This
view has profound implications for choice-of-law rules generally,
and for the law of bankruptcy and secured credit in particular. It
suggests the choice of "decentralizing" choice-of-law rules that do
not allow repeat players to externalize the impact of their home coun-
try law.75
In this section, I will explain both my reservations about uni-
form law making generally, and the desirability of decentralizing
choice-of-law rules. I will then discuss the implications of those
principles for choice-of-law in cross-border insolvencies.
A. Universal Proceduralism and the Limits of Harmonization
In my view, international lawmaking efforts relating to insol-
vency should limit their aspirations toward harmonization to the few
73. Janger, Predicting, supra note 12; Edward J. Janger, The Locus of Lawmaking, 74
AM. BANKR. L.J. 97 (2000). Here, I am referring to the recent efforts by the American Law
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to
promulgate revised versions of Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
While Article 1 is gaining an increasing number of adoptions, a number of provisions have
been uniformly rejected. Revised Article 2 has not been adopted anywhere, and appears
unlikely to gain widespread acceptance. Revised Articles 3 and 4 were amended in 2002.
Currently, Arkansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Mexico, Nevada, South Carolina and Texas
have been the only states to adopt the revised article. See Amendments to Articles 3 and 4
of the UCC, available at http://iww.nccusl.org/Update/uniormactjctsheets/uniormacts-
Is, -ucca3.asp. These problematic legislative trajectories are mild compared to the history of
the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act or UCITA, which was initially
intended to become part of the Uniform Commercial Code as Article 2B, but proved so
controversial that the American Law Institute withdrew its support. UCITA has been
adopted by two states, Virginia and Maryland, but many more states have adopted so-called
"bomb shelter" statutes that instruct courts not to give effect to the provisions of UCITA in
those states. See infia note 92 and accompanying text.
74. Janger, Predicting, supra, note 12, at 593; Janger, Proceduralism, supra note 13, at
845.
75. Ted Janger, The Public Choice (#'Law in Sqftware Transactions: Jurisdictional
Competition and the Dim Prospects of Unilbrmity, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 187, 190 (2000).
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procedural rules necessary to administer a case comprising all of the
debtor's assets and operations and a set of choice-of-law principles
that would limit the effect of choice-of-forum on substantive entitle-
ments. These limits on the universalist aspiration are driven by two
related concerns: (1) the effect of anticipated capture and anticipated
jurisdictional competition on efforts to harmonize bankruptcy law
and procedure; and (2) the effect of jurisdictional competition on
courts and legislatures.
The first set of concerns derives from reservations about har-
monization efforts generally. Alan Schwartz and Bob Scott 76, and
1,77 have raised concerns about "private legislatures" in the domestic
context, and Paul Stephan78 has raised similar concerns in connection
with lawmaking efforts by UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT in the com-
mercial law area. One of the goals of UNCITRAL when it drafts a
model law is to obtain widespread adoption.79 As a practical matter,
there are two prerequisites to such widespread adoption: (1) strong
support from a group or groups; and (2) lack of significant opposi-
tion. Harmonizers as distant in time as Homer Kripke have recog-
nized that without an interest group to spearhead adoption, uniform
laws (domestic or national) are likely to fall victim to the inertia of
the status quo. 80 This need for support makes uniform lawmaking
processes prone to capture. And, even where law reform efforts are
not spearheaded by a dominant interest group, they must respond to
the threats of various groups to oppose the statute when it is promul-
gated. 81 The model law drafters must anticipate the possibility that
individual legislatures in enacting states may be captured. The har-
monizers must, therefore, act preemptively to co-opt any group capa-
ble of threatening opposition at the local level. Harmonization ef-
76. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 12, at 607.
77. Janger, Predicting, supra note 12, at 623 24.
78. Stephan, supra note 12, at 756 61.
79. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 11.
80. Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Unilbrm Commercial
Code, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 321, 327 (1962). As Kripke noted, "[t]he draftsmen and the
members of the sponsor organizations knew that to draft a dead-letter bill would accomplish
nothing. The Code had to be enacted .. " Id. He went on:
The Code would have been a sitting duck target for any determined special
interest or combination of special interests who chose to attack one or more
features of the bill persistently. Thus, it was important not to arouse the
opposition of banks or finance companies, warehouse companies, railroads, or
other private trade groups.
Id.
81. Janger, Predicting, supra note 12, at 584.
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forts are also prone to the effects of pernicious jurisdictional competi-
tion. Jurisdictions compete with each other for commercial activity.
Sometimes this competition is beneficial, leading to a race to the
top. 82 Other times this competition leads to a race to the bottom. In
either case, harmonization can be problematic. Where jurisdictional
competition is likely to lead to a race to the top, harmonization may
hasten the adoption of an efficient rule, but it can also short circuit or
prevent the experimentation that can lead to the formulation of that
rule. Where a race to the bottom is concerned, the problems are even
greater. Harmonizers may be forced to anticipate the results of juris-
dictional competition, and may encourage the adoption of an ineffi-
cient rule. 83 Because of these related concerns, I have argued at
length elsewhere that the aspirations of harmonization ought to be
limited, for the most part, to procedural rules. 84
In this regard, the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border
Insolvencies, now enacted in the United States as Chapter 15 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides an excellent example of procedural
harmonization.8 5 I have reservations, however, about ongoing efforts
to harmonize the laws of secured credit and bankruptcy, at least to
the extent that they seek harmonization for its own sake. 86 Instead, I
advocate a uniform choice-of-law principle that will provide predict-
ability, without mandating uniformity. In the next section, I argue
that predictability can be achieved while minimizing the effects of fo-
rum shopping, by adopting, where possible, decentralizing choice-of-
law rules.
82. Lucian Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1435 (1992).
83. Janger, Predicting, supra note 12, at 827-31.
84. Janger, Proceduralism, supra note 13, at 821 22.
85. John A. E. Pottow, Procedural Jncrementalism: A Model fi)r International
Bankruptcy, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 935, 992 (2005) ("[The Model Law's] gentle incrementalism
regarding indirect, non-core areas of the law likely assuaged some hesitant, territorialism-
inclined states skeptical about universalism's benefits, and perhaps even tricked (to their
paternalistic betterment) some troglodyte states prejudiced against universalism
altogether."); Janger, Proceduralism, supra note 13, at 824, 832.
86. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency may be immune from these
reservations. That document might be better described as a template for "standardization"
rather than "harmonization." The drafters of the Legislative Guide recognized that many
aspects of bankruptcy law may reflect considered policy choices. In these instances
transparency and predictability may be the most that can be hoped for, and may indeed be
the most that is desirable.
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B. Centralizing and Decentralizing Choice-of-Law Rules
A frequently overlooked aspect of choice-of-law is that the
choice-of-law rules can have a significant impact on forum shopping,
and hence, jurisdictional competition. In a world characterized by en-
terprises and transactions that span multiple jurisdictions, choice-of-
law rules come in two flavors, "centralizing" and "decentralizing." A
centralizing choice-of-law rule allows a transaction or enterprise to
be governed by the law of one jurisdiction. A decentralizing choice-
of-law rule creates the possibility that an enterprise or transaction
may be governed by the law of more than one jurisdiction. To the
extent that uniformity and predictability are desired, centralizing
choice-of-law rules are helpful. By contrast, to the extent that forum
shopping or a race to the bottom are of concern, centralizing choice-
of-law rules are likely to exacerbate the problem by increasing the
benefits conferred by a forum shop, and increasing the benefit that
can be offered by a jurisdiction seeking to attract business (or litiga-
tion).
Two examples of centralizing choice-of-law rules demon-
strate their effect on jurisdictional competition:
" In Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha
Service Corp.,87 the U.S. Supreme Court declared that in con-
sumer credit transactions, the law governing a loan was the
law of the jurisdiction where the lender was located.88 The
effect of this decision is not hard to discern. All of the major
credit card banks have now located themselves in jurisdic-
tions with favorable laws on such important questions as usu-
ry and late fees. Citibank's credit card bank is located in
South Dakota. MBNA and many others have incorporated
their credit card banks in Delaware.
* The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, known
as "UCITA," 89 adopts a centralizing choice-of-law rule for
mass market software licenses. The law of the jurisdiction of
the licensor controls. This is in contrast to the rule followed
in Europe for mass market software transactions, where the
87. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
88. Id. at 299-300.
89. Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (1999), available at http://www.
law.upenn.edu/blil/archives/ulc/ucita/ucita200.ht-n.
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law of the jurisdiction of the purchaser/licensee controls.90
This rule was very important to the large sellers of software,
who took the view that they did not want to have to master
the licensing law of multiple jurisdictions. 91 The rule was al-
so extremely controversial, drawing intense criticism from,
among other groups, librarians. While UCITA has only been
adopted in two states, Virginia (the home state for America
Online) and the neighboring state of Maryland, intriguingly,
four states have adopted so-called "bomb shelter" amend-
ments to the UCC that are intended to deny effect to UCITA
in those jurisdictions.92
Both the Marquette case and the UCITA experience illustrate a fa-
miliar public choice insight. Where a transaction type is character-
ized by relatively small numbers of repeat players on one side of the
transaction and a large number of one-shot players on the other, the
repeat players may seek a choice-of-law rule that allows them to
govern their transactions with the law of their home state. This has
considerable advantages in terms of efficiency and predictability for
the repeat player, but it also creates considerable opportunities for
small states to attract business with legal rules that advantage the re-
peat player at the expense of more diffuse customers in other states or
nations. 93 A "decentralizing" choice-of-law rule, by contrast, limits
the ability of jurisdictions to compete for business by offering advan-
tageous legal treatment. The cost of a decentralizing choice-of-law
rule is the loss of uniformity, and the added cost of doing business
across multiple legal regimes.
Whether one should choose a centralizing or decentralizing
rule turns on two inquiries: (1) Is this a rule on which jurisdictional
competition is likely to lead to a race to the top or a race to the bot-
tom, and (2) if it is a rule where a race to the bottom is expected, then
how do the costs of the inefficient rule compare to the costs of non-
uniformity? The calculus is dynamic-once businesses have been
attracted by a favorable legal rule, the businesses have an incentive to
90. Francois Dessemontet, The European Approach to E-Commerce and Licensing, 26
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 59, 72-73 (2000).
91. Id.; see also Ted Janger, The Public Choice of Choice of Law in So/hiare
Transactions: Jurisdictional Competition and the Dim Prospects frlr Uniformity, 26 BROOK.
J. INT'LL. 187 (2000).
92. American Library Association, UCITA and Related Legislation in Your State,
available at http://www.ala.org/ala/aboutala/offices/wo/woissues/copyrightb/ucita/
states.cfm.
93. Bebchuk, supra note 82.
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ask for more, in return for a commitment to stay, and the host juris-
diction has an incentive to grant it.94 For example, Delaware, South
Dakota and other jurisdictions that initially attracted large credit card
banks by lifting their usury rules have gone on to adopt asset backed
securitization facilitation acts that seek to grant favorable bankruptcy
treatment to financing transactions entered into by credit card
banks.95 To the extent that these legal rules are efficient, the positive
effect of jurisdictional competition is magnified. To the extent that
the legal rules are the product of special interest lobbying and impose
costs on citizens of other jurisdictions or on disorganized groups, that
effect too is magnified.
C. Secured Credit, Bankruptcy Law and the Need for a
Decentralizing Choice-of-Law Rule
Thus, the key determinant in choosing between a centralizing
or decentralizing choice-of-law rule is whether a particular rule or
enactment is likely to generate a race to the top or a race to the bot-
tom. 96 If a race to the top is likely, then a centralizing rule is in or-
der. Capture is also a concern, but, at least in this context, the stakes
of capture are tightly linked to the stakes of jurisdictional competi-
tion. If a race to the bottom is a concern, then the costs of pernicious
competition must be weighed against the costs of non-uniformity.
As Bebchuk has argued, a race to the bottom is likely where a
rule allows one constituency of a firm to increase the risk faced by
another constituency without having to pay, or where a rule allows
the citizens of one state to externalize risk to the citizens of another
state.97 In the corporate law context, rules of the first sort are rules
that interfere with transparency or that entrench incumbent manage-
ment. Secured credit operates in this fashion to allow equity holders
and secured lenders to join forces and place uncompensated risk on
94. See LAURA JOFFE NUMEROFF, IF You GIVE A MOUSE A COOKIE 2 (1985)("he's going
to ask for a glass of milk.").
95. Edward J. Janger, The Death qf Secured Lending, 25 CARDOzO L. REV. 1759,
1760-61 (2004) [hereinafter Janger, Death ofSecured Lending] (listing statutes).
96. While the focus of this article is bankruptcy law, the close interrelationship
between bankruptcy law and the law of secured credit, coupled with the ongoing efforts to
harmonize the law of secured credit, has caused me to discuss both areas together.
97. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992).
[48:401
VIRTUAL TERRITORIALITY
non-adjusting creditors such as employees and small suppliers, and
on non-consensual creditors such as tort claimants. 98
In the case of bankruptcy, the dynamics are more complicat-
ed. Lynn LoPucki has argued forcefully, but controversially, that in
the bankruptcy context Delaware and the Southern District of New
York have competed for Chapter 11 business by offering bankruptcy
rules that advantage incumbent management and senior lenders at the
expense of others.99 While I think that LoPucki's concerns about
U.S. judges are overstated, I agree that forum shopping in bankruptcy
does place undesirable stresses on the bankruptcy system. Particular-
ly in the international context, there may be an incentive for local
legislatures to adopt rules that are friendly to incumbent management
or particular groups of powerful creditors, in order to encourage
debtors to arrange their affairs so that a particular country will be an
appropriate bankruptcy venue. If this is the case, it counsels strongly
for a "decentralizing" choice-of-law rule for both bankruptcy law and
secured credit.
D. Bankruptcy, Secured Credit and the Need to Distinguish
Procedure from Substance
Note that this concern about jurisdictional competition applies
only to rules that can be described as distributional, or substantive,
and that allow for the externalization of costs. In the absence of con-
cern that states may be externalizing costs, or that incumbent man-
agement of the debtor may be seeking to advantage or disadvantage a
particular constituency, there is no reason to distrust the beneficial
effects of competition. Thus, to the extent that one can identify "pro-
cedural" rules and distinguish them from rules that are "substantive"
and prone to pernicious competition, then it is possible to seek the
benefits of a centralizing rule without fearing its costs. This is where
"virtual territoriality" comes in. To the extent that bankruptcy proce-
dure can be distinguished from bankruptcy substance, the costs of fo-
rum shopping and pernicious jurisdictional competition can be avoid-
ed. The dangers of centralized procedure can be ameliorated by the
deployment of a decentralizing choice-of-law rule for substantive
questions. The key principle of virtual territoriality is that the choice
98. Bebchuk, supra note 82; Edward J. Janger, Predicting, supra note 12; Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditors Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887 (1994).
99. LoPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 18.
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between a centralizing versus a decentralizing choice-of-law rule
falls along the procedure/substance axis.
Making such a distinction is not always easy, but that does
not mean that it can never be done. Indeed, and perhaps unintention-
ally, it appears that the drafters of Revised Article 9 may have stum-
bled first onto the principle of virtual territoriality when they drafted
the choice-of-law rules for that statute. While the law of secured
credit is by its very nature substantive, it has some procedural com-
ponents. Article 9 establishes and effectuates the property rights of
secured parties-a distributive task. 100  However, it also sets forth
procedures for putting third parties on notice, and for operating filing
offices and so forth.10 1
This is precisely the line that the revisers of Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) followed when they centralized
the procedures for publicizing personal property security interests.
One of the principal changes effectuated by Revised Article 9 of the
UCC was to change the choice-of-law rule that governed tangible
collateral. Under Former Article 9, a secured creditor perfected its
security interest in tangible collateral by filing a financing statement
in the jurisdiction where the collateral was located (a decentralizing
rule). 10 2 For multi-state enterprises this created a need for multiple
filings in multiple jurisdictions. The effect was to increase the cost
of completing a transaction, and, worse, it created multiple opportu-
nities for error.10 3
Revised Article 9 changed that rule, and now provides that to
perfect a security interest in tangible collateral, the secured party
must file a financing statement in the jurisdiction where the debtor is
located. 10 4 Moreover, for a corporate debtor this was deemed to be
the jurisdiction of incorporation. 10 5 Procedurally, one filing in Dela-
ware replaced many filings throughout the country. Substantively,
however, an opportunity for abuse was created. If this choice-of-law
rule applied to all aspects of a secured credit transaction, it would
turn Article 9 into a lever for jurisdictional competition. One juris-
100. U.C.C. § 9-322 (2000).
101. For example, the rules about where to file a financial statement merely establish
predictable procedure. Id. § 9-501.
102. Former U.C.C. §§ 9-103.
103. Lynn M. LoPucki, Why the Debtor's State o!Incorporation Should Be the Proper
Placefir Article 9 Filing: A Systems Analysis, 79 MINN. L. REV. 577 (1995).
104. U.C.C. § 9-301.
105. Id. § 9-307.
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diction might compete for corporate charters by enacting a particular-
ly favorable rule for secured parties. The creation of a uniform filing
rule might lead to the creation of non-uniform priority rules.
Whether intentionally or unintentionally, the drafters of Re-
vised Article 9 effectuated a rather ingenious splitting of the choice-
of-law rules between the law governing perfection of a security inter-
est, and, for tangible collateral, the law governing the effect of per-
fection.10 6 Choice-of-law for procedure was divorced from choice-
of-law for substance. The filing procedure could then be safely cen-
tralized.
Unfortunately, by comparison, the drafters of Revised Article
9 had it easy. For bankruptcy law, the line between substance and
procedure is not as simple to draw. Because the substance of bank-
ruptcy law can lead to forum shopping, a decentralizing choice-of-
law rule is in order. However, to maximize the value of a multina-
tional enterprise in general default, a unified coordinated procedure is
also necessary. 10 7  While bankruptcy law is largely procedural,
providing a procedure for winding up a business, it also contains
some major substantive rules limiting the rights of secured parties
upon default, establishing priority among unsecured creditors and
other things. Bankruptcy rules must therefore be divided into three
categories: procedural rules that do not have distributive conse-
quences, distributive rules that are not essential to effectuating effi-
cient going concern reorganizations and, finally, rules that have some
distributive consequences but are essential to effectuating efficient
going concern reorganizations.
On its face, this tripartite categorization of bankruptcy rules
would appear to doom an effort to construct a workable disaggrega-
tion of bankruptcy rules along the substance/procedure line. If there
are distributive rules that are essential to effectuating going concern
reorganizations, then a certain amount of pernicious forum shopping
is going to be inevitable. However, at least as a conceptual matter,
there is a way around this problem. A unified, universal bankruptcy
106. Id. § 9-301. This same bifurcation was not possible for "intangible" collateral such
as accounts and general intangibles. Not surprisingly, Delaware has enacted at least one
non-uniform statute that, to facilitate securitization, potentially alters the perfection rules for
sales of promissory notes and payment intangibles. Janger, Death o!SecuredLending, supra
note 95, at 1760-61.
107. Procedural centralization is not, in and of itself, troubling. Procedure is less likely
to be subject to pernicious jurisdictional competition. Instead, jurisdictions that compete on
the basis of procedure will seek to move faster, coordinate better and administer assets more
efficiently.
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procedure only really matters where value can be created by centrali-
zation. It is a common exercise in U.S. business reorganizations to
compare the value of a company's assets when liquidated to the value
of the company if reorganized as a going concern.108 It is this "going
concern surplus" that justifies the limitations that Chapter 11 places
on the non-bankruptcy rights of creditors. Under U.S. law, for ex-
ample, a plan of reorganization cannot be confirmed unless the debt-
or establishes that the distribution to creditors under the plan will be
more valuable to the creditors than their share of the liquidated com-
pany. 109
It is this same "best interests" or "Pareto" principle coupled
with the existence of a going concern surplus that saves virtual terri-
toriality. In a cross-border case, the debtor should not be able to re-
organize unless the creditors in each country receive at least what
they would have received had the entity been liquidated in a territori-
al case.
E. Virtual Territoriality
The universal proceduralist model for cross-border bankrupt-
cy cases seeks to capture the benefits of coordination in a single main
case, without triggering the dynamics of jurisdictional competition.
The mechanism combines (1) a mandatory rule for choice-of-forum;
(2) a centralizing choice-of-law rule for procedures that allow for the
coordination of a bankruptcy case across borders and (3) a decentral-
izing choice-of-law rule for distributive/substantive rules of law that
affect creditor entitlements (up to the territorial liquidation thresh-
old). The centralizing procedure generates the benefits associated
with a single coordinated case. Forum shopping is neutralized, how-
ever, through a mandatory rule for forum choice (such as COMI) and
a predictable decentralizing choice-of-law rule. I refer to this scheme
as "virtual territoriality" because it will frequently mean that one
court will have to administer a case that is governed under the law of
several jurisdictions at once. To understand it, it is necessary to de-
scribe it first for a single firm, and then for a corporate group.
108. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2005).
109. Id.
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1. Single Firm
Where a single firm has assets and operations in multiple ju-
risdictions, one must ask which questions are governed by the law of
the bankruptcy forum state, and which are governed by the law of the
jurisdiction where the assets or the creditors are located.
Imagine a company with its center of main interest in country
A, but with significant tangible assets located in jurisdiction B (en-
cumbered by liens held by creditors also located in jurisdiction B),
and significant contracts entered into with counterparties in jurisdic-
tion C (who received significant payments shortly before the bank-
ruptcy). The creditors in jurisdiction B and the counterparties in ju-
risdiction C all knew that they were dealing with an entity located
(with a COMI) in jurisdiction A. Further imagine that the debtor
seeks to reorganize by filing a bankruptcy case in jurisdiction A (its
home court). While the courts of A may provide a procedure for re-
organizing, and reorganization may be in the best interests of all of
A's creditors, if the debtor wishes to gather the assets in jurisdiction
B it will need to have the orders of the proceeding in jurisdiction A
recognized by the courts of B. Similarly, if the debtor wishes to bind
the parties to contracts in jurisdiction C to the orders issued by the
court in jurisdiction A, or recover preferential payments made to
creditors in jurisdiction C, it will have to do so with the cooperation
of the courts of jurisdiction C.
A modified universalist would take the view that all of the
debtor's assets should be administered in the courts of jurisdiction A.
The validity of the property and contract claims would be determined
using the law of the jurisdiction dictated by private international law,
but the treatment of those rights in bankruptcy would again be deter-
mined under the bankruptcy law of the jurisdiction A, the forum
state.
A territorialist, by contrast, would take the view that assets
should be administered wherever located. The validity of claims and
the disposition of assets should be determined under the law of the
jurisdiction where the assets are located, and private international law
should determine which jurisdiction's laws should determine the va-
lidity of claims. To put it another way, the contract claims and prop-
erty rights are to be administered in the courts of the situs jurisdiction
under the law of the situs jurisdiction.
The universal proceduralist would administer both the assets
and the contracts in the court of the debtor's COMI, but would apply
the principles of virtual territoriality to deal with both validity of con-
tract claims and property rights, and their treatment in bankruptcy.
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Control over the case and decisionmaking would be governed by fo-
rum law, but issues such as priority and avoidance would be deter-
mined under the law of the situs (of the assets or the claim). The
courts in jurisdiction A would seek to apply, to the extent possible,
the same law that a court in B would apply with regard to assets lo-
cated in jurisdiction B, and the law that C would apply to contract
disputes and avoidance actions for transactions "sited" in jurisdiction
C. In all likelihood, the law of the jurisdiction where the assets are
located will govern the tangible property, and the law of the jurisdic-
tion that is the situs of the contract will govern the contractual rights.
2. Corporate Group
Where corporate groups are involved, virtual territoriality
could work the same way. The cases could be administratively con-
solidated in the jurisdiction that was the COMI for the group. How-
ever, the COMI court would administer the cases of the various sub-
sidiaries under the law of the COMI for the subsidiary. So, if the
COMI of the debtor was jurisdiction A, but it had subsidiaries located
in jurisdictions B and C, the court in A would be charged with, as
much as possible, administering the cases of the subsidiaries as if
they had been filed in the COMI of the subsidiary. This is merely an
extension of the principles articulated for a single firm. The main
difference is that control rights with regard to the assets might be dif-
ferent across national boundaries. As I have noted elsewhere, this
may seem awkward on its face, but even under current law, courts are
not unfamiliar with simultaneously administering multiple cases for
members of a corporate group whose cases have been administrative-
ly consolidated. Furthermore, where it is efficient to do so, the court
in the debtor's COMI would still be free to allow the debtor to open
up a secondary case in a secondary jurisdiction to allow it to adminis-
ter the assets of the subsidiary separately.110 Whether or not to do so
would be determined according to the exigencies of the case, as de-
termined in the home court, rather than through far flung fights over
recognition in multiple jurisdictions.
110. Unlike under the EC Regulation, however, the "secondary" or "ancillary"
proceeding would not have to be a "winding up" or "liquidation."
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F. Disaggregating Substance and Procedure
Westbrook takes the position that "control, priority, avoid-
ance and reorganization policy" should be determined by the law of
the jurisdiction where the "main proceeding" is pending.111 He
acknowledges that "lex fori" or the law of the forum will determine
much of what goes on in a bankruptcy case. Private international
law, or ordinary choice-of-law principles, will be used to determine
the status of a claim, but virtually everything about how a claim will
be treated will be determined by the law of the chosen forum.112
Virtual territoriality envisions a much more limited role for
the law of the forum, and a much more substantial role for principles
of private international law. Virtually the only thing that should be
determined by the law of the forum is control. Where a single entity
is involved, control will likely also carry with it governance, but that
is coincidental, as the Model Law determines that the main case must
be the entity's COMI, and under non-bankruptcy law, the real seat of
the corporation would usually determine the governance rules that
apply to the assets. Similarly, with regard to priority, the question
should be answered not by reference to the choice-of-forum but by
reference to ordinary principles of choice-of-law. If the situs of a
contract is located in a particular country, then the priority that would
be accorded in that country ought to be granted to the creditor.
Avoidance can similarly be handled by using the law of the jurisdic-
tion most tightly related to the transaction.
As a first cut, the line might be drawn as follows. Essential
procedures, to be determined by law of forum might include scope of
the estate, scope of the automatic stay and scope of discharge (subject
to best interests). Substantive provisions, where applicable law
would be determined by private international law, might include
claims allowance, claim priority, avoidance and plan (a single entity
will use the plan procedures of the COMI, but a group will have to
handle national subsidiaries according to principles available under
law of the COMI of the subsidiary). Thus, where a cross-border case
is dealing with a single entity, the situations where modified univer-
salism and universal proceduralism will diverge will be rather small,
except in the cases where (as in consumer credit or mass market
sales) the debtor is doing business in many jurisdictions with individ-
uals who do not perceive themselves to be engaged in cross-border
111. Westbrook, Financial Storm, supra note 22, at 1021 22.
112. Id. at 1022.
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transactions (buying software or widgets at the shopping mall).
However, where corporate groups are involved the divergences be-
tween the two approaches may become more significant. A main
court may find itself administering a subsidiary under the law of an
entirely different jurisdiction. This may seem improbable, but it is
not much more difficult than what happens when U.S. bankruptcy
courts administer cases that have been administratively but not sub-
stantively consolidated.
When the EC Regulation and the provisions of the Legislative
Guide are evaluated in light of the virtual territorialist approach, they
give far too great a role to lex concursus. 113 The Legislative Guide
allows forum choice to determine governance and the priority of
claims, and excludes only avoidance actions from the powers of the
home court. The EC Regulation goes even further. The treatment of
secured creditors and the avoidance actions that are available are de-
termined by the law of the jurisdiction where the case is opened.
If the goal of bankruptcy choice-of-law rules should be to dis-
tinguish substantive from procedural rules, the EC Regulation and the
Legislative Guide fail.
11. VIRTUAL TERRITORIALITY IN ACTION
While neither the EC Regulation nor the Legislative Guide
follow either a universal proceduralist or virtual territorialist ap-
proach on paper, this does not mean that virtual territoriality does not
have some descriptive power when one observes how recent cross-
border cases have actually been conducted. In this section, I look at
two cross-border bankruptcies, the Collins and Aikman 114 bankruptcy
and the Federal Mogul 115 bankruptcy, to show that, even now, the
principles of virtual territoriality can be seen operating in U.S. and
EU cases.
A. Collins and Aikman- Virtual Territoriality Operationalized
Collins and Aikman provides an example of how virtual terri-
toriality can operate, even under the EC Regulation, at least in the
113. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
114. Collins & Aikman Europe SA, Re, [2006] EWHC (Ch) 1343 (Eng.).
115. In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., 330 B.R. 133 (D. Del. 2005).
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hands of a pragmatically oriented common law judge.1 16 Collins and
Aikman was a manufacturer of automobile parts. When it filed for
bankruptcy, it opened up plenary cases in the U.S., Canada and the
U.K. to deal separately with its operations in North America and the
EU. 117
The European case provides an example of how a "virtual ter-
ritorial" approach can pave the way toward a successful reorganiza-
tion.1 18 The goal of the cases opened in the U.K. was to find a buyer
for the company's European operations. Once a buyer was found,
there was concern that opening secondary cases would delay and
perhaps block the sale. However, German and Spanish creditors took
the view that application of local priorities would have yielded a bet-
ter distribution than that available under British law.' 19 The adminis-
trators of the U.K. case did not want to complicate the case by open-
ing secondary cases in Germany or Spain, so they promised to grant
the equivalent of local treatment to the Spanish and German trade
creditors.120 However, they were then faced with the problem of fig-
uring out how to deliver on that promise within the strictures of the
EC Regulation. 121 As noted above, Article 4 of the EC Regulation
116. Collins & Aikman, [2006] EWHC 1343.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. para. 8. The court noted:
The joint administrators were of the view that the opening of such secondary
proceedings and the appointment of local officeholders would have been likely
to have impeded the achievement of the purposes of the administration by
making it difficult to continue to trade the businesses, fund the administrations
and conduct sales processes on a group-wide basis. To avoid such secondary
proceedings oral assurances were given by or on behalf of the joint
administrators to creditors at creditors' meetings and creditors' committees'
meetings that if there were no secondary proceedings in the relevant
jurisdiction then their respective financial positions as creditors under the
relevant local law would as far as possible be respected in the English
administration.
Id.
121. Id. para. 10. The court noted:
By April 2006, then, the joint administrators had a problem before them. They
had given assurances which they wished to honour, assurances given not only
with a view to the benefit of creditors generally but assurances which had
conduced to achievement of that benefit. Those assurances had included
performance by the joint administrators of differing provisions, country by
country, as to local law as to, for example, the preferences to be given to
particular classes of creditors and the subordination or not of inter-company
indebtedness, provisions which were different from the applicable provisions of
English law, the law of the main proceedings.
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mandates the application of U.K. priorities to the U.K. case. There-
fore, the administrator was forced to engage in some creative lawyer-
ing to convince the U.K. judges to allow the debtor to honor the
deal. 122 The administrator appealed to the British court, and was able
to convince the judge (stripped to the essentials) that under U.K. law,
where officers of the court make promises that are in the best interest
of the estate but deviate from the U.K. priority scheme, and where
the honor of the administrator can be upheld only by enforcing those
promises, the court may allow the administrator to honor those prom-
ises. 12 3
Thus, in Collins and Aikman, one company was able to im-
plement the principle of virtual territoriality, but doing so was in ten-
sion with the structure set forth in the EC Regulation and required
some sophisticated common law lawyering to achieve. As Gabriel
Moss, one of the lawyers in Collins and Aikman, noted:
If sufficient flexibility can be found in other European
laws where main proceedings are opened, Collins &
Aikman will be an obvious model for the way to har-
monize the need for centralization and simplicity, on
the one hand, and the respecting of local priorities, on
the other.124
Under current law, however, such flexibility is by no means guaran-
teed. One might well imagine a civil law judge or a judge in a juris-
diction with territorial bankruptcy law refusing to implement the
structure envisioned by the debtor in Collins and Aikman. They
might instead have required the opening of secondaries. The result-
ing delay and winding up required by the Regulation might then have
precluded a going concern sale of the debtor's assets.
122. Moss, supra note 32, at 1017 18.
123. Collins & Aikman, [2006] EWHC 1343, para. 15. The court cited the rule of Ex
parte James, In re Condon, (1874) 9 Ch App. 609 [1874-80], and described it as follows:
"'This elusive and difficult principle is based on morality. At the centre of the principle is
that if an officer of the court is under an obligation of conscience, then the court will direct
the officer to fulfill that obligation."' Collins & Aikman, [2006] EWHC 1343, para. 15
(quoting MCPHERSON, THE LAW OF COMPANY LIQUIDATION (4th ed. 1999)).
124. Moss, supra note 33, at 1018.
[48:401
VIRTUAL TERRITORIALITY
B. Federal Mogul- Virtual Territoriality Ignored
By contrast, in the case of Federal Mogul,125 a failure to fol-
low the virtual territorial approach nearly derailed the reorganization.
When Federal Mogul, another U.S. automobile parts supplier, filed
for bankruptcy, its goal was to resolve its outstanding asbestos
claims. Cases were opened in the U.S. and the U.K., and early in the
case a basic settlement was reached under which the asbestos claim-
ants against the U.S. and the U.K. entities would receive the same
proportional payout. Later in the case, however, it became apparent
to the parties that they had missed a key issue. The capital structures
of the U.S. and U.K. companies were substantially different. In the
U.S., virtually all of the company's assets were liened by secured
creditors. As a result, the payout to unsecured creditors, including
the asbestos claimants, would have been relatively small. By con-
trast, the capital structure of the U.K. subsidiaries was relatively free
of secured debt. As a result, the unsecured claimants against those
entities would have received a considerably more generous distribu-
tion than their U.S. counterparts. This led the initial settlement to
crumble. The case was only put back on track when the settlement
was adjusted to reflect the different territorial payouts to the claim-
ants against the various entities.
Both Collins and Aikman 126 and Federal Mogul 127 illustrate
the importance of respecting the territorial entitlements of creditors,
even in a universal bankruptcy case. Collins and Aikman further
demonstrates the value of being able to achieve one's territoriality
"virtually" through choice-of-law. To the extent that a universal
main case can administer assets in a manner that mirrors the treat-
ment that would be received in a purely domestic case, the less re-
sistance local creditors will have to the results in the main case. Fur-
thermore, where secondary or ancillary cases must nonetheless be
opened, the ancillary courts will have fewer qualms about cooperat-
ing, and fewer domestic pressures not to cooperate. At the same
time, by enhancing the scope of the "main" case, the virtues of coor-
dination can be better obtained. In other words, it is possible that a
125. In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., 330 B.R. 133 (2005). An excellent retelling of
the history of the Federal Mogul case, by one of the participants, can be found in the
proceedings of the 2007 Meeting of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges. Mark
Andrews, The Federal Mogul Restructuring, Program Materials, 81 st Annual Meeting of the
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges 14-5 (2007) (on file with author).
126. Collins & Aikman, [2006] EWHC 1343.
127. Federal-Mogul, 330 B.R. 133.
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decentralizing choice-of-law rule for "substantive" questions will en-
hance the ability of the main case to centralize and coordinate the
"procedural" aspects of the case.
CONCLUSION
In sum, under U.S. bankruptcy law, a prerequisite to the con-
firmation of a plan of reorganization is the requirement that the plan
must satisfy the so-called "best interests" test. Creditors must receive
at least as much in the reorganization as they would have received in
liquidation. 128 Since there is no such thing as "global" bankruptcy
law, there is no such requirement in cross-border cases. However,
both Collins and Aikman and Federal Mogul illustrate that Pareto op-
timality operates as a practical constraint on a cross-border case as
well. The entitlements that a creditor would have received under lo-
cal law, in the absence of a going concern reorganization, provide a
practical floor to distributions in cross-border cases. Because territo-
rial liquidation is the default result in the absence of a successful con-
sensual reorganization, local creditors can, as a practical matter, al-
ways oppose local recognition of orders issued in the main
jurisdiction, whenever the distribution in the cross-border case is less
than the alternative "territorial" distribution. Virtual territoriality
embraces this principle respecting territorial entitlements by seeking
to limit the scope of lex concursus and by seeking to ensure that the
distribution to creditors in a cross-border case mirrors or exceeds the
distribution they would receive in a territorial case.
Virtual territoriality also has implications for efforts to har-
monize bankruptcy procedure and to standardize bankruptcy law.
Specifically, the broad scope given to lex forum concursus in the
proposed choice-of-law provisions in the Legislative Guide may be a
tactical error, with consequences not just for the Guide but also for
the future adoption of the Model Law. The reality of international
insolvency reform is that many countries view both the Model Law
and the Legislative Guide as instruments of U.S. (and to an increas-
ing extent U.K.) bankruptcy imperialism. By enhancing the central
force of the "main" case, the Model Law, it is feared, will subject
creditors to the long reach of U.S. and U.K. bankruptcy courts. 129
This fear is enhanced when the choice of the main forum carries with
it choice of rules with distributive content. In other words, adoption
128. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a).
129. LoPucki, Global, supra note 18.
[48:401
2010] VIRTUAL TERRITORIALITY 441
of the approach to choice-of-law suggested in the Legislative Guide
may actually endanger widespread adoption of the Model Law, and
may harm the chances for evolution of global norms for coordinating
bankruptcy cases.
By contrast, the approach advocated here should considerably
reduce the stakes associated with COMI choice and the costs of def-
erence to the main case. The more the court in the main case focuses
solely on coordination and value maximization, and does little to al-
ter territorial distributional priorities, the more likely it is that the
benefits of coordination will be achieved.
